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Abstract
This paper provides an evaluation of a training programme for graduates entitled “Work
Experience for Graduates” (WELL - Work Experience Laureati and Laureate) that was re-
cently implemented in Italy. The aim of the programme was to increase the career prospects
of unemployed graduates in the region of Umbria. It consisted of two measures: (i) on-the-
job training for unemployed graduates, and (ii) wage subsidies to firms and organisations for
hiring the trainees at the end of the programme. We rely on administrative data and match-
ing methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention in terms of the employability of
participants. Results indicate that WELL participants are more likely to be employed and to
sign an apprenticeship contract within the region. We also find substantial gender differences
in employability and the type of contract obtained, with men having a higher probability of
finding a job (permanent contract or apprenticeship). We show that this may be explained by
different choices in terms of field of study, with males being more prone to enrolling in scientific
areas and females in the humanities.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of labour market policies has been extensively debated in the recent literature.
However, no consensus has been reached regarding the impact of some types of policies, such
as those supporting the implementation of training programmes, since the effectiveness of these
programmes strongly depends on the time horizon over which the employment effects are measured.
As summarised by Card et al. (2010, 2018) in their meta-analysis, training programmes show
larger average effects in the medium- and long-term. This also applies to private sector incentive
programmes, and the reason for this lies behind so-called “lock-in” effects. As discussed by Ham and
Lalonde (1996) among others, participants in training and private sector employment programmes
often reduce or suspend their normal job search efforts while participating in these programmes,
drastically reducing their employment opportunities in the short-term.
Moreover, traning programmes have been for long conceived for low educated youth. Hence,
most of the existing empirical literature refers to the impact of training programmes on this specific
sub-population. By contrast, evidence on the impact of training measures on highly educated
individuals is scarce.
This paper analyses the effectiveness of an intervention targeting graduates that was imple-
mented in 2013 in the Italian region of Umbria. The programme, entitled “Work Experience for
Graduates” (WELL - Work Experience Laureati e Laureate), subsidised on-the-job training for
unemployed graduates. It received financial support from the European Social Fund (ESF) and
had two main goals: increasing the employability of unemployed graduates residing in Umbria and
enhancing the innovative capacity and productivity of participating firms.
This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature in two ways: first, it provides additional
evidence on the effectiveness of training programmes in Italy, for which evidence is scarce. Second,
it contributes to the literature that analyses the transition from tertiary education to the labour
market.
We combine different sources of administrative data, namely, data on the programme partici-
pants provided by the Office of Statistics and Evaluation of the Umbria Region, as well as data from
the Compulsory Communication Database (CCD), which was collected from local labour offices by
the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.
The effectiveness of WELL in terms of the employability of participants is evaluated using a
matching approach where unemployed graduates participating in the intervention are compared
to the whole population of unemployed graduates that reside in the region of Umbria but did not
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take part in the intervention. The outcome variables of interest are measured in December 2015
and refer to: the probability of being employed in the region of Umbria, of being registered as
unemployed in the region of Umbria, as well as the type of contract received (if employed).
Our analysis shows that at the end of 2015 (up to two years after the programme), WELL
participants are more likely to be employed in Umbria than non-participants. Participating in
WELL increases the probability of being employed by about 11 percentage points (pp). We do not
find any meaningful effect on the probability of obtaining a permanent contract or a temporary
contract, but we find a positive effect (4 pp) on the probability of obtaining an apprenticeship
contract. Hence, the latter seems to be the most important route towards employment for WELL
participants. Interestingly, when we split the sample by gender, we find that participating in WELL
is more beneficial for men, both in terms of employability and the type of contract obtained. We
find heterogeneous effects by field of study, with more positive effects for individuals with a degree
in science. By contrast, individuals with a degree in the humanities benefit somewhat less from
participating in the programme. Such differential impacts may be explained among others by two
factors, such as labour demand in the region of Umbria and the relatively lower relevance of job-
specific work experience for this type of skills. In light of these results, the aforementioned gender
difference in the employment responses to the programme may be explained by the fact that men
are more likely than women to complete a degree in science.
Although we refer to a relatively small region and a small scale intervention, the analysis of
graduates’ employment prospects is particularly relevant for policy making, especially given the
rising enrolment rates in tertiary education in many countries and the increased emphasis on
improving graduates’ employability after the 2008 financial crisis (Pavlin and Svetlik, 2014). In
Italy in particular, the inadequacy of graduates’ skills or work experience is pointed out as a
major problem for the labour market and accordingly, the provision of relevant training and work
experience to tertiary students is identified as a key policy measure to facilitate the transition from
education to work (European Union, 2015). Analysing the employment prospects of graduates in
Italy is also particularly relevant in light of the recent reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility of
the Italian labour market.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 provides a description of the intervention and the selection procedure. In Section 4 and
5, we present the data and the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analysis. Section 6
explains the empirical strategy implemented to quantify the impact of the WELL intervention and
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presents the main results. Finally, in sections 7 and 8 we discuss the results and conclusions of the
evaluation.
2 Literature Review
Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of training programmes across European countries tends
to be mixed. Germany is the European country with the most solid experience in terms of the
evaluation of training programmes, which can partly be explained by the interest in evaluating
the Hartz reforms implemented in the early 2000s to tackle high unemployment rates in the coun-
try. Evaluations of various training programmes show both positive and non-significant effects on
employability and wages in the medium- and long-term.
Kopf (2009) and Rinne et al. (2011) consider both short- and medium-term programmes, finding
that public training programmes positively affect employment prospects independently of the skills
and age groups of participants, whereas Lechner et al. (2011) find negative effects for all types of
training in the short-term, but positive effects on employment rates and earnings in the long-term
(after about two to four years). Finally, Schwerdt et al. (2012) and Go´rlitz and Tamm (2016)
find no significant effects of training programmes on both wages and employability, even in the
medium-term.
These findings are also confirmed by the evaluations of programmes and similar reforms in
France, Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark. Che´ron, Rouland and Wolff (2010) estimate the
impact of firm-provided training on labour market mobility in France, showing that participation
in a training program reduces the probability of switching jobs or becoming unemployed in the two
subsequent years. Cockx and Van Belle (2018) arrive at similar conclusions, finding small positive
effects for training and counselling measures devoted to recent graduates in Belgium. Hidalgo et
al. (2014) show that in the Netherlands training vouchers on low-skilled workers do not have any
significant impact on monthly wages or on job mobility, but have a significant impact on future
training plans. Danish job training programmes are analysed by Jespersen et al. (2007), who assess
the long-term employment and earning effects on participants in both the private and the public
sector. They highlight that the positive post-programme effects on earnings eventually materialise
after one to three years. Focusing on youth unemployment and providing a survey of the recent
evidence from European countries, Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) confirm mixed effects of labour
market training, depending on the type and on the country.
The evidence on the effectiveness of training programmes in Italy, is scarce. However, two
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regional programmes implemented in Italy have been recently analysed. The first study evaluates
the “Paid Quality Traineeships” programme within the Giovanis´ı project that was launched in the
Italian region of Tuscany in 2011 (Sciclone et al. 2018). The programme is similar in terms of
design to the Umbria programme, but has a slightly different target group. In fact, it targets youth
aged 18-29, who are either graduates or drop-outs in the previous two years, and resident in specific
municipalities of Tuscany (about 74% of municipalities have been included). These traineeships
have a maximum duration of 6 months and have an educational scope, as firms that hire the trainees
need to assign them a tutor. The authors combine administrative data for both the participant
and non-participant groups granted by the Tuscany Region. They use propensity score matching to
estimate the impact of the programme on youth employability two years after the completion of the
training. Results show a positive effects of participation in the training programme on employment
(especially for young people with no working experience), within 18 months from the start of the
traineeship. Nevertheless the study has some caveats. One of the main limitation is that that the
authors are not able to match individuals on education, which is an important variable to take into
account when looking at young people without any working experience. Our analysis overcomes
this difficulty and allows to account for both educational level and field of study.
The second study by Pastore and Pompili (2018) concerns the evaluation of an integrated plan
of employment and labor policies (PIPOL), launched by the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia
in 2014. PIPOL includes a series of programmes financed by the European Social Fund, with the
aim of improving the transition process of the youth from the world of school and university to
that of work. In particular, the authors evaluate the first phase of PIPOL (2014-2018), and focus
on programmes related to extra-curricular training and internships. They employ counterfactual
impact evaluation methods (propensity score matching) but also a more qualitative approach to
evaluate the impact of PIPOL on job placement for different participants’ characteristics (gender,
age, nationality, etc). The main findings are that the training programme seems to be successful
among women, youth younger than 30 and immigrants. A common result with this study is that
we also find that the WELL programme was successful for those younger than 30, but differently
from the study we find men to be more successful in terms of labour market outcomes compared
to women.
More generally, the peculiarities of the Italian labour market have recently been investigated
to assess the impact of specific measures: the so-called 2015 Good School reform1, and the 2003
1The Good School reform introduced, among other things, compulsory work-related learning in the last two years
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reform of apprenticeship contracts. Picchio and Staffolani (2013) investigate the impact on job
opportunities resulting from firm-provided training through apprenticeship contracts. Compared
to other types of temporary contracts, apprenticeships are found to be more effective in leading
workers to a stable job relationship, especially within the same firm where the apprenticeship was
undertaken. Investigating the same topic, Albanese et al. (2017), focus on the impact of the 2003
reform of the Italian apprenticeship contract, showing the positive effect of the new apprenticeship
on the transition to permanent employment, mostly in large firms.
Regarding the Good School reform, Pastore (2017) highlights that the elements that make the
transition from school to work problematic stem from the low level of both secondary and tertiary
education attainment and the rigidities of the education system (especially tertiary education),
which might delay entry into the labour market from university. The Italian institutional setting
of education, training and welfare systems was also analysed in a cross country comparison, to
document how it affects the youth disadvantage in the labour market (Pastore 2015, 2018). In
particular, the author discusses that poor performances of youth labour market participation and
youth unemployment may depend on the specific school-to-work transition regimes, and on poor
levels of integration between the education systems and the labour market.
The employability of Italian graduates has been analysed from various perspectives. Ballarino
and Bratti (2009) assess if, and to what extent, different fields of study affect graduates’ chances of
employment. Taking into account the increasing flexibility of the Italian labour market following
the recent reforms, they find that scientific fields, as compared to the humanities, consistently
guarantee a higher probability of stable jobs in the university-to-work transition.
Brunello and Cappellari (2008) study the importance of the attended college on the earning and
employability prospects of students three years after graduation. They conclude that the choice of
college has an impact on employment, especially in the short-term.
Finally, Di Pietro and Urwin (2006) assess the effect of over-education on the earnings of Italian
graduates. They show that over-educated graduates receive lower wages than peers with a similar
level of education who do not experience education mismatch in their jobs. Interestingly, this effect
does not depend on the under usage of skills, but rather on human capital and job features.
In the same vein, Aina and Pastore (2012) show that delayed graduation increases the chances
of over-education, thereby contributing to the wage penalty faced by over-educated workers.
Despite growing interest in the analysis of the employment prospects of tertiary graduates, little
of higher secondary school, with the aim of facilitating the transition from school to work.
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evidence is available on the active labour market policies targeting graduates.
3 Description of the WELL programme
The WELL intervention was financed through the ESF and implemented in 2013 as part of the
Regional Operational Programme of the Umbria Region.2 Its main goal was to reduce unemploy-
ment among the youth and to strengthen the professional qualifications of graduates by raising the
quality of their jobs.
More specifically, it was designed to promote fully-subsidised work experience, with the aim of
increasing employment among highly educated individuals, who have a higher risk of exclusion from
the labour market. The programme also included the provision of wage subsidies to employers who
hired WELL participants at the end of the training. The programme also aimed to promote the
dissemination of modern and efficient production processes and to increase the innovative capacity
and productivity of the participating firms.
The intervention was therefore characterised by a strictly integrated path consisting of two steps:
i) on-the-job training for unemployed graduates; ii) wage subsidy to firms and organizations that
hire the trainee after completion of the training. The training was expected to last six months, with
a minimum weekly commitment of 24 hours and a gross monthly salary of 800 euros per trainee.3
The subsidy awarded to firms and organisations varied depending on the type of contract offered.
For a trainee hired with a fixed-term contract of at least six months, the subsidy was 2,500 euros,
whereas for an apprenticeship contract, it amounted to 4,000 euros. For an open-ended contract, a
subsidy of 6,500 euros was offered.
The intervention’s beneficiaries were unemployed people, including first-time jobseekers, who
held a bachelor’s or master’s degree and resided in Umbria at the time of programme’s launch (May
2013). Participants’ unemployment status had to be demonstrated through registration in public
employment offices. Companies and organizations involved in the intervention, such as associations,
foundations, cooperatives and consortia, were required to have at least one production/work unit
in Umbria and to have at least two permanent employees.4
2It was implemented under the ESF Objective 2 2007-2013 Programming Period and within the Annual Regional
Plan for Interventions in Support of Work.
3In addition, the training experience had to be coherent with the activities and work organization of the hosting
firm, and the list of activities to be undertaken by the trainee had to reflect the knowledge, professional skills, and
educational qualification of the trainee.
4In addition, employers had to be in compliance with workplace security and safety procedures, and to have
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To avoid the possibility that the intervention could produce displacement effects, companies
applying for the intervention had to show no dismissals of workers with similar occupational tasks
to the ones they were hiring for in the year preceding the traineeship.5
The WELL project was launched in May 2013 and was completed in September 2014. A shortlist
of around one hundred eligible firms in Umbria was published in order to encourage participation
in the intervention, and participants also used their personal networks to find potential workplaces
in which to complete a traineeship. Applications were examined by the regional Department of
Labour Policies and eligible applications were ranked according to the following criteria:
• Commitment of the host company to employ the trainee at the end of the traineeship; de-
pending on the type of job contract:
– open-ended contract (full-time and part-time) [5 points];
– fixed-term contract, lasting at least six months [2 points];
– other types of contract [1 point];
• Applicant with a disability under the rules of Italian national law 68/1999 [1 point];
• Applicant’s age:
– below 29 years old [2 points];
– 30-39 years old [3 points];
– 40 years old or above [4 points];
• Innovative activities of the host organization, defined as participation in regional/national
poles or clusters, or ministerial research laboratories [2 points].
In case of equal scores, the ranking was determined according to the chronological order of
submission of the electronic application. For both of the intervention phases, a quota for female
applicants was put in place, accounting for 50% of the initial amount of funding for the intervention
(1.2 million euros). The intervention was very successful in terms of participation. In fact, the
number of applications received exceeded the expectations of the implementing authority. To meet
established specific procedures for employing persons with disabilities (Law no. 68 of 1999).
5In addition, the companies must not have benefited from the wage guarantee scheme (“cassa integrazione
guadagni”) in the previous year.
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this unforeseen demand, the budget for the programme was increased to 3.6 million euros and all
eligible applications were admitted. Consequently, the quota for women proved to be unnecessary.
The number of applications received for the WELL programme totalled 712, 30 of which were
ineligible to participate. Of the 682 eligible applicants, 74 decided not to begin the traineeship
and 34 dropped out during training. A total of 574 graduates successfully completed the work
experience. The occurrence of drop-outs could be due to the administrative burden related to the
framing of the traineeship period. As for the second phase in the intervention, grant subsidies were
allocated to 96 companies and host organisations that recruited 98 trainees who had successfully
completed the first phase. Of these, 13 workers were employed with a permanent contract, 51 were
hired with a temporary contract and 34 were employed with an apprenticeship contract. In the
next session we also provide some descriptive evidence on the characteristics of the firms that hired
the WELL participants after the completion of the on-the-job training programme.
4 Data
This analysis combines micro-data on the WELL intervention from the Regional Monitoring Sys-
tem Database and administrative data regularly collected from local labour offices by the Italian
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, i.e., the Compulsory Communication Database (CCD- Co-
municazioni Obbligatorie, COB). The CCD collates information about all hirings, as well as any
prolongations, transformations, and cessations of labour contracts, which private companies and
public administrations are required to communicate to the labour offices. In addition, it keeps a
record of jobseekers registered at public employment offices, while it does not comprise information
on self-employment. This information system is operated by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Policies in cooperation with regional governments, the National Institute of Social Security (INPS),
the Italian Government Agency for the Insurance against Work-related Injuries (INAIL) and, since
2015, with the National Agency for Active Labour Policies (ANPAL). Since 2008, all companies
operating in both the private sector and public administration are obliged to communicate hirings,
prolongations, transformations and cessations of labour contracts by accessing and entering the
data into an online information system referred to as “Compulsory Notifications”.6
We have access to the CCD for the region of Umbria, which collects information on the em-
6This information system was introduced on December 27th 2006 in Law No. 296, Art.1, paragraphs 1180 to
1185, which laid down the financial law for 2007. On 29 November 2016 the online ANPAL portal has been activated,
following Law 14 September 2015, No. 150.
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ployment and registered unemployment periods of people residing in the region. The data used for
the analysis consists of information for the period of July 2013 to December 2015 for all individ-
uals in the sample. Thus, we have information on individuals in both the treatment and control
group, from before and after the intervention. We observe a number of individual characteristics
measured in July 2013, which are pre-determined with respect to the start of the intervention,
and outcome variables measured in December 2015 referring to the labour market status of the
individuals. Specifically, in July 2013, all graduates in the population of interest are unemployed,
while in 2015, in addition to individuals’ employment status, we can also observe the type of firm
and the sectoral level in which those who are employed are working.
Our sample consists of the target population for the programme, i.e., all graduates residing
in Umbria who are unemployed on the day of the application deadline for participating in the
WELL intervention (July 2nd 2013). All individuals are eligible and hence intended recipients of
the programme. Some participate (treatment group) and some do not (control group).
The treatment group is composed of 574 participants who completed the training phase of the
WELL programme (out of 682 eligible applicants). The control group includes the whole population
of registered unemployed graduates residing in Umbria who did not participate in WELL. This
group comprises 6,950 individuals.
5 Descriptive statistics of WELL participants and non-participants
This section describes the target population of the programme, which is the sample used for this
analysis, and presents the outcome variables used in the evaluation.
5.1 Demographic characteristics
Tables 1 - 4 below present the descriptive statistics for participants and non-participants. The
population of interest comprises all unemployed graduates (including first-time job seekers), reg-
istered as unemployed in the region of Umbria and residing there on the deadline for applications
to the WELL intervention. This consists of 6,654 individuals. Of these, 574 participated in the
intervention. After applying standard cleaning procedures, we are left with a final sample of 5,816
individuals: 5,266 non-participants and 550 participants.7 The rest of the analysis is based on this
7We drop 157 non-participants with a PhD degree. We do this because none of participants have a PhD degree
which means that these control units cannot be exploited in the matching exercise. For the same reason, we drop 24
non-participants whose field of study belongs to the category “Services”, since none of participants belongs this field
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Table 1: Labour market status of WELL participants and non-participants in 2013, by gender (%).
WELL No WELL
LM Status 2013 Male Female Total Male Female Total
Unemployed 31.4 68.6 100 27.55 72.45 100
Unemployed-first entry 29.95 70.05 100 33.46 66.54 100
Total 30.91 69.09 100 28.73 71.27 100
N.Obs. 170 380 550 1,513 3,753 5,266
Table 2: Labour market status of WELL participants and non-participants in 2013 by age group
(%).
WELL NO WELL
Age group Unempl. Unempl. (first entry) Total Unempl. Unempl. (first entry) Total
0-24 6.89 7.49 7.09 2.33 14.41 4.75
25-29 42.42 51.87 45.64 19.33 49.76 25.43
30-35 31.13 26.74 29.64 33.1 23.03 31.09
35-40 12.12 10.16 11.45 20.47 5.69 17.51
>40 7.44 3.74 6.18 24.77 7.11 21.23
Total 363 187 550 4,211 1,055 5,266
N.Obs. 100 100 100 100 100 100
final sample.
Among WELL participants, the number of unemployed people with previous work experience
is double that of first-time jobseekers. In the control group of non-participants, the number of
unemployed people with previous work experience is four times that of first-time jobseekers. Women
are equally represented among WELL participants and non-participants (around 70%).
As for the age distribution of individuals, there is a higher proportion of participants in the
younger age group (24-29 years). In contrast, the oldest groups (35-40 and 40+ years) are less
represented than in the non-participant group. Note that the age of both participants and non-
participants is measured at the time in which WELL programme was launched.
of study. We drop few observations with missing values in the field of study: 561 non-participants and 4 participants.
Finally, we drop few individuals who in 2015 are doing an internship: 72 non-participants and 20 participants. In
principle, internship would be an interesting outcome. However, this category is too small to be considered as a
separated outcome variable. Therefore we ignore it.
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Table 3: Educational level of WELL participants and non-participants in 2013, by gender (%).
WELL NO WELL
edulevel Male Female Total Male Female Total
Bachelor degree 33.53 32.63 32.91 27.3 19.21 21.53
Master degree 66.47 67.37 67.09 72.7 80.79 78.47
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N.Obs. 170 380 550 1,513 3,753 5,266
Table 4: Field of study of WELL participants and non-participants in 2013, by gender (%).
WELL NO WELL
Field of study Male Female Total Male Female Total
Education 3.53 10.26 8.18 2.91 10.84 8.56
Humanities and Arts 17.65 26.58 23.82 17.32 30.72 26.87
Social Sciences, Business and Law 35.29 41.32 39.45 33.77 32.59 32.93
Science 8.24 8.42 8.36 12.16 11.06 11.37
Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 24.71 7.89 13.09 23.27 7.57 12.08
Agricultural 4.12 2.11 2.73 5.09 2.42 3.19
Health 6.47 3.42 4.36 5.49 4.8 4.99
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N.Obs. 170 380 550 1,513 3,753 5,266
As shown in Table 4, there is a large proportion of unemployed people in the humanistic
disciplines such as the social sciences, business and law. By contrast, jobseekers with a degree
in science tend to be less represented in the WELL group, when compared to non-participants.
While we have more detailed information on the specific field of study for WELL participants, this
information is not available for non-participants. Therefore, we refer to the definitions of areas of
study provided by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) in order to classify information available
in the CCD for non-participants.
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In order to ensure the similarity and comparability of the participant and non-participant groups
with respect to all observable characteristics such as age, education, gender, etc., we select covariates
available for both groups in the two data sources (i.e., intervention data for the treatment group
and administrative data for the control group).
Table 5 reports the observable individual characteristics measured in 2013 (before treatment
takes place) for both treatment and control groups.
The first and third columns show the average value of each characteristic for the treatment
and control groups, respectively. The last column reports the p-value obtained for the difference
between the average values in the first and third columns. In bold, we indicate the characteristics
for which the difference between treatment and control groups is statistically significant (at the 95 %
confidence level). On average, the treatment group is significantly younger than the control group.
Conversely, in the treatment group, the proportion of individuals at least 35 years old amounts to
only 17%, while in the control group they represents 39%. In addition, a higher proportion of people
in the treatment group have a degree in the social sciences, business or law (39% in the treatment
group versus 33% in the control group), and have a bachelor’s degree (33% in the treatment group
versus 22% in the control group). By contrast, a higher proportion of individuals in the control
group have a degree in science (the 3% difference between the two groups is statistically significant
at the 95% confidence level) and obtained a master’s degree (78% in the control group and 67% in
the treatment group). Lastly, those in the treatment group are significantly more likely to reside
in Perugia, the capital of the region.
5.2 Outcomes
To characterise the labour market status of individuals, we consider the following outcome variables:
• Employment status indicator: equal to one if the individual is employed according to the
CCD data for the region of Umbria, and zero otherwise. Note that this definition is different
from the traditional employment rate. In addition to having a regular job, it requires that
the job be located in Umbria. Working in a neighbouring region is coded as zero. This
definition is not fully satisfactory, as it does not count working outside of Umbria as a success.
However, it represents a relevant outcome variable in our context, as the main objective of
the programme is to boost employment among graduates residing in the region of Umbria.
Since the programme is implemented in this region, it is important to assess the local effects
of the programme.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of covariates for WELL participants and non-participants.
WELL NO WELL t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. t P-val
Female 0.69 0.46 0.71 0.45 -0.02 -1.07 0.28
Age group: 0-24 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.02 2.41 0.02
Age group: 25-29 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.20 10.21 0.00
Age group: 30-35 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 -0.01 -0.70 0.48
Age group: 35-40 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.38 -0.06 -3.61 0.00
Age group: >40 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.41 -0.15 -8.48 0.00
Field of study: Education 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.00 -0.31 0.76
Field of study: Humanities and Arts 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44 -0.03 -1.54 0.12
Field of study: Social Sciences, Business and Law 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.07 3.09 0.00
Field of study: Science 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32 -0.03 -2.14 0.03
Field of study: Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.01 0.69 0.49
Field of study: Agricultural 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.00 -0.59 0.55
Field of study: Health 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 -0.01 -0.65 0.52
Level of study: Bachelor’s degree 0.33 0.47 0.22 0.41 0.11 6.09 0.00
Level of study: Master’s degree 0.67 0.47 0.78 0.41 -0.11 -6.09 0.00
PES: Perugia 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.07 2.95 0.00
PES: Citta´ di Castello 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.82 0.41
PES: Foligno 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.20 0.84
PES: Terni 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.42 -0.06 -3.36 0.00
PES: Orvieto 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 -0.02 -2.24 0.03
Prov: Perugia 0.81 0.39 0.74 0.44 0.07 3.46 0.00
Prov: Terni 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 -0.07 -3.46 0.00
Nr. past unemployment spells 1.79 1.64 1.93 1.48 -0.13 -1.96 0.05
Nr. past employment spells 0.75 1.23 1.17 1.43 -0.41 -6.52 0.00
Nr. past spells in training 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.21 0.02 2.50 0.01
Nr. past inactivity spells 0.63 1.23 0.35 0.90 0.28 6.58 0.00
Obs 550 5,266 5,816
Note: This table tests for each covariate whether the means for the treated (WELL) and for the controls (NO WELL) are
statistically different between each other. The column “Diff” shows the difference between the mean for the treated and of the
controls. The t-test is computed based on a regression of each covariate on the treatment indicator. Column “t” reports the
t-statistic of the estimated coefficient and the column “P-val.” reports the corresponding P-value.
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• Unemployment status indicator: equal to one if the individual is registered as unemployed on
the lists of the unemployment offices of the region of Umbria, and zero otherwise. Also in this
case, our definition of unemployment status does not consider being registered as unemployed
in the unemployment offices of other regions.
The following comments are worth noting. First, since our employment rate is based on ad-
ministrative data, we are not able to observe individuals working in the underground economy.
However, to the extent that the objective of the policy is to increase formal employment, this is not
a limitation of the study. Second, the adminstrative data at hand provide us with information on
dependent employment. This means that we do not observe self-employed people. However, given
the nature of the programme under study, we believe this is a minor issue. We expect a traineeship
programme to be successful if the trainees remain employed in the firm once the traineeship ends.
Third, since the unemployment rate is based on adminstrative data, we cannot observe discouraged
workers who are out of the labour market (both in Umbria and in neighbouring regions). However,
we believe that our measure of unemployment rate is relevant for the evaluation of the policy, since
registered unemployed are the target of active labour market programmes implemented by the local
authorities.
In addition to the outcome variables related to one’s labour market status, we also consider the
type of contract (permanent, temporary or apprenticeship) registered by December 2015, based on
administrative data from the CCD data for the region of Umbria. The outcomes referring to the
type of contract are intended to evaluate the effect of the programme on job quality. Accordingly,
we study the probability to be hired with permanent, temporary or apprenticeship contract, as
proxies of good quality jobs. We ignore precarious contracts, since the aim of the programme is
not to enhance the probability to be hired under those types of contracts.8
All outcome variables are measured in December 2015, i.e., between one and two years after
the completion of the on-the-job training programme.
The possibility of extending the time horizon of the post intervention period beyond the short-
term turns out to be particularly beneficial in the evaluation of training programmes, since there
could be issues related to lock-in effects. Specifically, participants in WELL, as opposed to non-
8Examples of precarious contracts are: contracts for continuative and coordinated services (Co.co.co), intermittent
work, domestic work, ad interim employment. Note, the employment rate is one also if one is hired with a precarious
job, because these individuals are in fact employed. The employment rate gives a rough measure of the success of
the programme, while results by type of contract are intended to give more insight on the quality of the job obtained
thanks to the programme.
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participants, were limited in the time they could dedicate to searching for jobs while they undertook
the training programme. However, the lock-in effect does not rule out the hypothesis that training
can increase participants’ employment prospects, since the programme could prove effective if
evaluated in the medium or long-term, when lock-in effects fade away or are outweighed by the
beneficial effects of the programme.
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the outcome variables, namely, employment status (top
panel) and type of contract (bottom panel), for the treatment (WELL participants) and control
(non-participants) groups. The first and third columns show the proportion of WELL participants
and non-participants, respectively, who are employed and unemployed. The fifth column shows
the test statistic for the difference in the averages by treatment status. Column six reports the p-
values for the t-tests on this difference. WELL participants seem to be more advantaged in terms of
labour market outcomes after completion of the training. They are more likely to be employed (the
difference in employment rates between the two groups is 16%). As for the type of contract, WELL
participants are more likely to get a temporary job or apprenticeship, but no significant differences
are found for permanent contracts. Nevertheless, we must be cautious about these comparisons as
they may be misleading due to selection bias.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of WELL participants (left panel) and non-participants (right
panel) that are employed as measured in 2015, by the municipality of residence. The shading in
the map darkens with higher employment rates. Overall, WELL participants are more likely to
be employed in 2015. In most centrally located municipalities the percentage of employed WELL
participants ranges between 40-80%, whereas the percentage of employed non-participants range
between 10-40%. In relatively small municipalities the percentage of employed among WELL
participants reached 80-100% (darker areas), whereas the percentage of employed among non-
participants was between 10-40%.
Besides providing descriptive evidence on the WELL participants we also show some descriptive
statistics on the type of firms that offered the training programme to the 550 participants (demand
side). For each firm we can observe the number of employees (firm size), the sector of activity9
and the location (municipality). Tables 7 shows the distribution of WELL participants across
firms, separately by firm size (number of employees in the firm). About 86% of WELL participants
completed their on-the-job training in very small or small firms having between 1 to 50 employees,
whereas 10% of them are working in middle-size firms and 2% in big firms. Table 8 shows instead
9This variable is affected by a large share of missing values, about 48%, so results should be taken with care.
15
Table 6: Outcome variables for WELL participants and non-participants in 2015.
WELL NO WELL T-test
Mean St. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Difference P-val
Employment indicator in Umbria 0.52 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.16 0.00
Unemployment indicator in Umbria 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.04 0.06
Permanent contract 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.01 0.53
Temporary contract 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.04 0.02
Apprenticeship contract 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.00
Obs 550 5,266 5,816
the average firm size by the type of industry or sector. Both tables show that the firms hiring
WELL participants tend to be small independently from the sector of activity.
Finally, we show the characteristics of the firms hiring WELL participants after the completion
of the on-the-job training. As explained above, there are three types of contract offered: permanent,
temporary and apprenticeship. 98 individuals out of the 550 WELL participants were hired at the
end of the programme, mostly with a temporary or an apprenticeship contract. Interestingly, the
very small firms are the only ones offering a permanent contract, whereas the medium-size firms
and large firms did not hire any participant on a permanent contract, preferring mostly temporary
contracts.
This piece of evidence is helpful because it highlights the fact that the programme was of small
scale.
Table 7: Distribution of WELL participants, by firm size.
Firm size (nr of employees) Freq. Percent Cum.
1-9 297 54.00 54.00
10-49 181 32.91 86.91
50-249 60 10.91 97.82
250+ 12 2.18 100.00
Total 550 100.00
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Table 8: Average firm size by type of sector.
Type of industry Average firm size
Accommodation and food service 18
Activities of households 9
Administrative, support service 102
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 22
Arts and recreation 27
Construction 5
Education 16
Electricity, gas supply 7
Financial and insurance 3






Transporting and storage 48
Health and social work 76
Retail trade; repair of vehicles 81
Missing 29
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Figure 1: Percentage of employed WELL participants vs non-participants in 2015, by municipality.
Table 9: Distribution of WELL participants by type of contract in phase 2 and firm size.
Type of contract
Firm size Permanent Temporary Apprenticeship Total
1-9 8 22 21 51
% 15.69 43.14 41.18 100.00
10-49 5 15 6 26
% 19.23 57.69 23.08 100.00
50-249 0 13 4 17
% 0.00 76.47 23.53 100.00
250+ 0 0 2 2
% 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Total 13 50 33 96
13.54 52.08 34.38 100.00
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6 Empirical strategy
This analysis aims to evaluate the impact of the WELL intervention on the labour market prospects
of the unemployed graduates targeted by this programme. As previously mentioned, the first set of
outcome variables that we consider are: i) the probability of being employed in Umbria (employment
status indicator, as observed in the CCD data for the region of Umbria), and ii) the probability of
being registered as unemployed in the unemployment offices of the region of Umbria. In addition,
we also study the probability of having either a permanent, temporary or apprenticeship contract.
We estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which represents the impact
of the WELL intervention for the target population (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The ATT is
calculated as the difference between the average outcome of the treatment group and the average
outcome of the treatment group in the counterfactual situation in which the treatment did not take
place. In the current analysis, this corresponds to the difference in employment status between the
WELL participants (observed in the data) and the WELL participants had the intervention not
taken place (counterfactual and thus unobserved scenario). The ATT is given by:
ATT = E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 1), (1)
where D is an indicator equal to one if the treatment takes place and zero otherwise, Y 1 is the
individual potential outcome given the treatment and Y 0 is the individual potential outcome in the
absence of the treatment. Note that for the ATT, both potential outcomes refer to the treatment
group, since they are conditioned upon D = 1.
This means that the ATT measures the effect of the programme on intended recipients. As
pointed out in Heckman (1997), the ATT this is the relevant estimator for policy, which targets
specific populations. A related parameter is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), which measures
the effect of a programme on the entire population - referring to both the intended and non-
intended recipients -, in case the programme was randomly assigned to individuals in the population
(Caliendo and Hujer, 2006).10 Since our analysis relies on the target population, conditioning upon
D = 1 in equation 1 is irrelevant, as the control group coincides with the universe of the intended
recipients of the programme. Thus, in this case, the effect of the WELL programme on a random
10As explained in Heckman (1997), the difference between the two parameters (ATT and ATE) relies on the
counterfactual group they use: in the ATT, the counterfactual is constructed with intended recipients (i.e. individuals
who are eligible to the programme but that have not been treated (yet). By contrast, the counterfactual group for
the ATE comprises all individuals in the population who did not receive the treatment, i.e. both intended recipients
and those for whom the programme was never intended.
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individual who is exposed to the programme (the definition of ATT) is obtained by estimating the
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) for our sample.
The identification problem for the ATT is that (Y 0|D = 1), the potential outcome of the
treatment group in the absence of treatment, cannot be observed. Therefore, the identification
strategy boils down to finding a proper control group that mimics the counterfactual situation of
the treatment group in the absence of the treatment. Once a suitable control group is available, the
identification of the ATT amounts to a simple difference following equation 1. The ATT amounts to
comparing the average of the outcome variable (i.e., the employment status) between the treatment
and control groups.
To identify the ATT, we rely on propensity score matching, which ensures that the outcomes of
treated units are compared with similar control units. We define the following quantities: Y 1 is the
potential outcome given the treatment; Y 0 is the potential outcome in absence of the treatment; D
is an indicator equal to one if the individual receives the treatment and zero otherwise; X is a set
of observable confounding characteristics that are correlated both with selection into the treatment
and with the potential outcomes.
The identification of the ATT relies on the following assumptions:
• i) Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): (Y 1, Y 0)D ⊥, X;
• ii) Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value Assumption (SUTVA); and
• iii) Common Support Assumption: 0 < P (D = 1 ⊥ X = x) < 1,
where X is a set of observable confounding characteristics that are correlated both with the selection
into the treatment and with the potential outcomes.
The first assumption implies that the treatment assignment is independent of the potential
outcomes with and without treatment if certain observable covariates are held constant. More
specifically, controlling for all observable characteristics X, the decision to participate is uncorre-
lated with potential outcomes. Hence, if treated and control units with the same values for these
observable characteristics show systematic differences in outcomes, these are attributable to the
treatment (Imbens, 2004). This assumption requires that all variables that need to be adjusted for
are observed; therefore the extent to which this assumption is reasonable depends on the richness
of data available.
The second assumption rules out spill-over effects or general equilibrium effects that may be
caused by the treatment. In the context of large-scale labour market policies, this statement may
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appear quite strong as it prevents crowding-out (displacement) effects in local labour markets:
specifically, if treated units are more likely to find a job due to the intervention, this should not
decrease the likelihood of control units finding a job. In addition, the intervention should not
affect control units via changes in the general equilibrium of wages in the labour market. In our
case, SUTVA is a reasonable assumption since the intervention target group is quite small (550
treatment units, compared to 5,266 control units) and thus unlikely to drive general equilibrium or
displacement effects.
The last assumption implies that for any given value of the observable characteristics, X, the
treatment assignment should not be certain. Therefore, for each value of the confounding variables
X, an individual could potentially be observed as treated or not. This assumption ensures that for
each treated individual (with given realisations of variables X), we can find a sufficiently similar
individual in the control group, i.e., a control unit that is identical to the treated one in terms of
variables X.
Basically, the purpose of the matching procedure is to estimate the ATT by comparing treated
units with control units that are similar in terms of observable characteristics that affect both
treatment participation and outcome variables. Ideally, we would like to compare the outcome
value of a treated unit i with the outcome value of a control unit j that is identical to i in terms
of a number of characteristics included in X.
Finding an exact match for each individual i becomes more difficult as the number of observable
characteristics increases. Adjusting for a set of covariates, X, to eliminate confounding factors leads
to the “curse of dimensionality” problem. However, it has been shown that adjusting only for the
propensity score is also sufficient to eliminate confounding (Abadie and Imbens, 2016). Formally,
the propensity score is the probability of being assigned to the treatment conditional on the observed
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). It summarises all information contained in X, and
has to be estimated to assign a given value to each individual in the sample. The propensity score
matching procedure involves comparing treated and control units with similar propensity scores.
If the propensity score is correctly estimated, individuals with similar scores are also similar in
terms of observable characteristics. This also means that one is comparing treated and control
units which are similar in terms of potential counterfactual outcomes. This derives from the CIA
assumption, replacing X with the propensity score P (X), as shown below: (Y 1, Y 0) ⊥ D|P (X)
. The selection process for treatment models the probability of being treated as a function of the
aforementioned covariates, as follows:
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P (D = 1) = f(X + ). (2)
The propensity score is a function of individual characteristics such as age, gender and all
possible observable characteristics. In our context, we also include available educational variables
regarding the field of study (e.g., science, education, etc.) and the degree completed (bachelor’s or
master’s). These variables are relevant for explaining one’s labour market status after participating
in the intervention, as this depends on regional labour demands in terms of educational background.
Similarly, individuals with specific educational profiles may be more or less likely to find a firm
in which to carry out a traineeship and therefore have higher or lower chances of participating
in the programme. Furthermore, we include the municipality of residence and the location of the
unemployment office where the individual was registered as unemployed.
This is meant to be a proxy for the local labour market where the individual is looking for a
job (or a traineeship through which to participate in the WELL intervention). This is relevant for
explaining both the outcomes and the decision to participate.
Lastly, we further enrich the set of covariates in the propensity score specification by adding
information on the past labour market experiences of individuals.
Gathering information on work patterns prior to participation in the WELL programme is
important in order to reduce the bias of self-selection into the programme (for example, more mo-
tivated individuals may be more likely to participate, depending on the quality of the programme),
as an individual’s previous work experience can be used as a proxy for that worker’s skills and
competences. To this end, we incorporate into the analysis data on the labour market status and
the type of contract of WELL participants and non-participants (control group) at fixed dates,
namely, on December 31st 2012, June 30th 2012, December 31st 2011 and June 30th 2011. These
data were extracted from the Compulsory Communication Database (CCD).
Following convention, the propensity score is calculated through maximum likelihood estimation
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The results of the analysis are discussed in Section 7.
7 Results
Table 11 reports our baseline results. As previously discussed, the objective of the intervention is
to increase the employability of jobseekers in the region of Umbria. Therefore, our outcomes refer
to employment status and the type of contract that an individual has if employed in Umbria.
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The first row reports the coefficients from a naive linear regression where each outcome is
regressed on the covariates in the right-hand side of equation 2 and the indicator for participation
in the intervention D, as in the following equation:
yi = α+ β1D + β
>
2 Xi + i (3)
The estimated coefficient β1 amounts to comparing the average for the outcome variable (e.g.,
employment status) in the treatment and control groups, controlling for a wide set of individual
characteristics and past labour market outcomes. The Ordinary Least Squares estimator (OLS)
provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect (β1 in equation 3) under two assumptions:
i) the CIA, i.e., the treatment indicator is exogenous, controlling for the covariates X in equation
(3); (ii) the functional form assumption, i.e., the true conditional expectations of the outcomes are
linear, so that the linear regression function provides a good approximation of the true conditional
expectations (Imbens, 2014). Hence, linear regression provides biased estimates of the treatment
effect if the conditional expectations are not linear and if covariate distributions are different in the
treatment and control groups.
A problem with this method is that results are very much affected by observations with extreme
values in the covariates. Outliers are precisely the units that are not appropriate as counterfactual
images of the treated units. While it is difficult to assess if true conditional expectations are linear,
so as to justify the use of linear regression, it is quite straightforward to check if the covariate
distributions differ by treatment status.
The t-tests for the differences in the means of all covariates between the two groups are reported
in Table 5 above and show that the distributions of age, field of study, level of study, past labour
market outcomes and residence are different between the treatment and control groups. This
suggests that linear regressions provide biased estimations of the treatment effect as the results
will be sensitive to outliers (which are not appropriate control units) and to the choice of the
(linear) specification. For convenience, we estimate a linear probability model and the coefficients
show a positive and statistically significant effect of participating in WELL on the probability
of finding a job in December 2015. In particular, participating in WELL increases employment
by 18 percentage points (pp). Furthermore, it increases the probability of having a temporary
or apprenticeship contract by 4 pp and 5.8 pp, respectively. Results are more conservative for
permanent contracts as they are statistically significant at 10% level.
We now turn to our matching estimates. In general, matching boils down to a number of non-
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Figure 2: Distribution of the propensity scores.
Note: This figure shows the distribution of propensity score.
parametric approaches (e.g., exact matching, propensity score matching, sub-classification) that
apply the following solution: no functional forms are assumed, but weighting schemes are applied
so as to make the covariate distributions in the treatment and control groups as similar as possible.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score in the treated and control
groups. The estimated propensity score has good balancing properties if both groups are equally
distributed along the propensity score. The figure indicates that there is a good overlap in the
distributions of the estimated propensity scores in the treatment groups.
Figure 3 shows the overlap of the distribution of the propensity score across treatment and
control groups for specific sub-groups in the population: for men, for women, for individuals with
bachelor’s degree and for individuals with master’s degree. We believe that the extent of overlap
in the distribution of the propensity score is overall satisfactory even when looking at specific
categories.
In addition, the propensity score has to satisfy the balancing property. This means that the
propensity score should be able to weight units to make the treated and the control group similar
and hence comparable. This can be checked by testing that the means for the treated and the
control groups in each covariate are not statistically different to each other after applying the
matching procedure. If the propensity score effectively enhances the comparability of both groups,
then there should be no difference in the means between treated and controls after matching in all
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Figure 3: Distribution of the propensity scores by gender and by level of study.
Men Women
Bachelor degree Master degree
Note: This figure shows the distribution of propensity scores for: men and women (top panel),
bachelor’s degree and master’s degree as the highest degree obtained (bottom panel).
covariates. This test allows to evaluate the quality of the matching procedure.
The t-test statistics for the differences between means are reported in the last two columns of
Table 10.
For each covariate, row “U” and “M” report the test computed before and after the matching,
respectively. The column “% bias” reports the the standardised percentage bias as computed in
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Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).11 It is a standard measure to evaluate the quality of the matching
procedure. As a rule-of-thumb, the bias after matching should be less than 5% in each covariate.
The values in rows “U” (i.e. before matching) confirm that before the matching the two groups
are unbalanced: for instance, the average age between treated and controls is statistically different.
Rows “M” (i.e. after the matching) show instead that the propensity score successfully reduces the
covariate imbalances: as for age, the means of treated and controls after the matching are much
closer to each other and the % bias drops from 59% to 3%. Overall, the matching fixes the balance
for all covariates, except for the category related to Engineering and Manufacturing, the category
related to bachelor’s degree and the category related to registering as unemployed in the PES offices
of Cittaa´ di Castello, whose % bias remains slightly above 5% (8.2%, 5.8% and 8%, respectively).
However, it is worth noting that the % bias is only marginally above the recommended threshold.
The matching procedure12 reports also the average % absolute bias as the overall measure of
covariate imbalance, which according to the rule-of-thumb should not exceed 25%. In our case, the
average % absolute bias is 17%. This suggests that our matching has good balancing properties.
The basic procedure consists of the following steps: First, we sort all units according to a
propensity score that represents the likelihood of participating in the programme. Second, we
compare the average outcomes of treated and control units with similar propensity scores, and
finally, we average these differences out over the distribution of propensity scores, so as to estimate
the ATT. The second and third rows of Table 11 report the results from two different matching
procedures. In both cases, we use matching with replacement, which means that each control unit
may be used as a match more than once. This improves the comparability between treated and
control units, thereby decreasing estimation bias. In the second row of Table 11, each treated unit
is matched with the control unit with the closest propensity score, whereas in the third row of
Table 11, each treated unit is matched with the 5 closest control units in terms of propensity score.
The choice of the number of control units to be used in each match (one in row 2 versus more
than one in row 3) entails a trade-off between bias and variance. Increasing the number of control
units to be assigned for each match tends to increase the bias (since each treated unit is compared
with control units that may not be as close in terms of propensity score), but it also increases the
precision of the estimate.
11This is the percentage difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-
samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated
groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
12The matching procedure was performed using the Stata packages pstest and psmatch2.
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of covariates for WELL participants and non-participants, after
matching.
Unmatched Mean t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control % bias t P.val
Age U 30.62 34.79 -59.20 -11.53 0.00
M 30.62 30.83 -3.00 -0.61 0.54
Female U 0.69 0.71 -4.80 -1.07 0.28
M 0.69 0.68 2.00 0.32 0.75
Field of study: Education U 0.08 0.09 -1.40 -0.31 0.76
M 0.08 0.07 3.30 0.56 0.57
Field of study: Humanities and Arts U 0.24 0.27 -7.00 -1.54 0.12
M 0.24 0.22 3.30 0.57 0.57
Field of study: Science U 0.08 0.11 -10.10 -2.14 0.03
M 0.08 0.08 1.80 0.33 0.74
Field of study: Engineering, Manufacturing U 0.13 0.12 3.10 0.69 0.49
M 0.13 0.16 -8.20 -1.29 0.20
Field of study: Agricultural U 0.03 0.03 -2.70 -0.59 0.55
M 0.03 0.03 1.10 0.19 0.85
Field of study: Health U 0.04 0.05 -3.00 -0.65 0.52
M 0.04 0.04 0.90 0.15 0.88
Level of study: Bachelor degree U 0.33 0.22 25.80 6.09 0.00
M 0.33 0.30 5.80 0.91 0.37
PES:Citta´ di Castello U 0.10 0.09 3.60 0.82 0.41
M 0.10 0.08 8.00 1.37 0.17
PES: Foligno U 0.15 0.15 0.90 0.20 0.84
M 0.15 0.17 -3.50 -0.57 0.57
PES: Terni U 0.16 0.22 -15.80 -3.36 0.00
M 0.16 0.14 4.60 0.84 0.40
PES: Orvieto U 0.02 0.03 -11.40 -2.24 0.03
M 0.02 0.01 4.60 1.08 0.28
Nr. unemployment spells U 1.79 1.93 -8.40 -1.96 0.05
M 1.79 1.87 -4.70 -0.76 0.45
Nr. inactivity spells U 0.63 0.35 25.60 6.58 0.00
M 0.63 0.61 1.90 0.27 0.79
Note: This table reports t-test statistics for the differences between means for each covariate (the last two columns
report the t-statistic and the corresponding P-value). The column “% bias” reports the the standardised percentage
bias as computed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). Rows “U” and “M” report these statistics computed before and
after the matching, respectively.
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Overall, the comparison between the results in the first row and those in the second and third
rows suggests that the matching procedure is somehow effective in reducing the bias. When applying
nearest neighbour estimators, the point estimates for the probability of being employed decrease
from 0.18 to 0.11. Accounting for as many observable characteristics as can be found in the
administrative data helps to reduce the differences between the treatment and control groups. As
for the type of contract, we see that participating in the WELL programme has a significant positive
effect of 3.8 pp on obtaining an apprenticeship contract, whereas the results are not statistically
significant when looking at the probability of obtaining a work contract (temporary or permanent).
This result is very much in line with the recent literature on unemployed youth, and especially the
unemployed youth in Italy.
The success of the programme is not clear-cut. On the one hand, the employment prospects
of participants seem to improve in the region of Umbria. However, this may conceal employment
prospects outside of the Umbria region or in the realm of self-employment work arrangement,
especially if for some reasons non-participants are more likely to move to other regions or to be
self-employed. This is not necessarily a negative outcome, but with the data at hand we are not
able to disentangle the effects of the programme outside the labour market of Umbria.
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Table 11: Effect of WELL on employment status and type of contract.
ATT Employed Unemployed Permanent Temporary Apprenticeship
Linear regression 0.1754*** 0.0166 0.0320* 0.0408** 0.0576***
(0.0231) (0.0199) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0123)
NN matching (n=1) 0.1069*** 0.0757** 0.0324 0.0027 0.0345***
(0.0354) (0.0300) (0.0312) (0.0170) (0.0102)
NN matching (n=5) 0.1150*** 0.0699** 0.0086 0.0133 0.0386***
(0.0271) (0.0302) (0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0096)
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816
Note: This table reports results from linear regression models (first row) and propensity score matching (second
and third rows). We use nearest-neighbour matching with replacement; in the second (third) row each treated unit
is matched with one (five) control(s). We consider indicators of labour market participation in the region of Umbria
in December 2015 (being employed, unemployed, columns 1-2), and the type of contract for employed individuals
(columns 3-5). We also account for past labour market experience. Significance: *** p ≤ .01, ** .01 < p ≤ .05, *
.05 < p ≤ .10. Standard errors in parentheses: for matching, robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors,
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors otherwise. The specification used for the estimation is as follows: age,
gender, field of study categories (Social Sciences, Business and Law is omitted as reference), level of study (master’s
degree is omitted as reference), dummies for the city in which individuals registered at the Public Employment
Office (Perugia is omitted as reference), the number of past unemployment spells and the number of past spells in
inactivity. This is the specification which gives the best balancing properties of the estimated propensity score.
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7.1 Heterogeneous effects
We now extend the analysis and provide separate analysis by age group, gender and field of study.
As previously, we report the results from the regression analysis in the first row and the results
from propensity score matching in the second and third rows.
We estimate our model separately by age group considering three categories: i) below age 30, ii)
age 31-40, and iii) 41 or more. Results are reported in Table 12. Two important results are worth
mentioning. First, participants younger than 30 are 21 pp more likely to be employed compared to
the other two groups according to the OLS specification and about 18 pp based on the matching
procedure.13 Second, participants younger than 30 have a higher probability of being employed
with a permanent contract (5 pp) or apprenticeship (8 pp) compared to participants aged between
31-40. A common result for the WELL participants in the age groups 31-40 and more than 41 is a
higher probability of being unemployed compared to non-participants (respectively 7 and 21 pp).
As expected the programme had a bigger impact on younger participants.
We now turn to our gender specific regressions (13). From the OLS estimates, we observe sub-
stantial differences between males and females in the probability of being employed in Umbria one
to two years after the completion of the training. Participating in WELL increases employability
by 15 pp for females (top panel) and by 26 pp for males (bottom panel). However, as discussed
above, OLS estimates are less reliable compared to matching. In the matching estimates (second
and third rows in both panels), this gap in employment rate persists. Participating in WELL in-
creases females’ employability by 4 pp when considering 1 closest neighbour (although the estimate
is not statistically different from 0), whereas for males, employability increases by 21 pp, which is
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. We obtain similar results when considering matching
with the 5 closest neighbours. Males participating in WELL also show a higher probability of hav-
ing a permanent or apprenticeship contract at the end of the training (13 pp or 8 pp, respectively).
For females, the magnitude of the coefficients is much lower and the estimates are not statistically
significant. One possible explanation for these differences relates to individuals’ field of study. To
tackle this issue, Table 14 reports separate estimates by field of study. In order to obtain more
robust estimates, we group fields of study into three categories: 1) Humanities, which includes
“Education”, “Arts and Humanities”, and “Social sciences, Business and Law”; 2) Science, which
includes “Science” and “Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction”; 3) Other, comprised of
13When we separate the analysis by age it becomes more difficult to obtain good matches for participants older
than 40 due to a lower sample size, so the results are less robust compared to the other two groups.
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those graduating in “Agriculture” and “Health”, of which there are very few. We report the re-
sults for the “Humanities” (top panel) and “Science”. As expected, we observe large differences in
terms of labour market participation. OLS estimates (first row of each panel) show that WELL
participants have a higher probability of being employed than non-participants, but the advantage
in terms of employability is higher for those graduating in “Science” (25 pp, compared to 14 pp
for those graduating in the “Humanities”). This gap becomes even greater when estimating the
model through propensity score matching. Graduating in “Science” increases the probability of
being employed in the region of Umbria by 18-20 pp (depending on the nearest-neighbour specifi-
cation), compared to 8 pp for those coming from the “Humanities”. All estimated coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level. The same pattern is observed when analysing the impact
of WELL on the type of contract, although the results are less compelling. Based on OLS results,
WELL participants graduating in “Science” have a higher probability of obtaining a permanent job
(by 8 pp), but this difference disappears when estimating the model via propensity score match-
ing. However, the difference in terms of obtaining an apprenticeship still remains, benefiting most
WELL participants graduating in “Science” (5-7 pp compared to 3-4 pp for those graduating in
the “Humanities”). Different mechanisms could be in place. First, our results may be explained by
an excess of supply with respect to demand for the type of skills acquired in the “Humanities” field
of study. A second possible interpretation could be that for those graduating in humanities work
experience might be less important, and they can re-enter the labour market with relatively lower
costs due to the specific skills acquired. Unfortunately with the data at hand we are not able to
disentangle between the two mechanisms, but overall our results are in line with the evidence from
other OECD countries, which shows that tertiary-educated adults with a degree in STEM (science,
technology, engineering and mathematics) benefit from higher employment rates than their peers.14
14For more details, see “Education at a Glance 2017: OECD indicators”.
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Table 12: Differences by age group.
ATT Employed Unemployed Permanent Temporary Apprenticeship
Age<30
Linear regression 0.2119*** -0.0391 0.0548*** 0.0324 0.1014***
(0.0298) (0.0256) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0205)
NN matching (n=1) 0.1759*** -0.0119 0.0529** 0.0159 0.0856***
(0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0265) (0.0223) (0.0224)
NN matching (n=5) 0.0002 0.2113** -0.0488 -0.0024 -0.0033
(0.0861) (0.0882) (0.0593) (0.0573) (0.0022)
Age 31-40
Linear regression 0.1603*** 0.0767** 0.0262 0.0704** -0.0088***
(0.0393) (0.0332) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0021)
NN matching (n=1) 0.1133** 0.0700* -0.0148 0.0408 -0.0102***
(0.0452) (0.0368) (0.0348) (0.0387) (0.0023)
NN matching (n=5) 0.0124 0.2673*** -0.0724*** -0.0357*** -0.0053**
(0.0729) (0.0724) (0.0084) (0.0095) (0.0022)
Age>40
Linear regression 0.0002 0.2113** -0.0488 -0.0024 -0.0033
(0.0861) (0.0882) (0.0593) (0.0573) (0.0022)
NN matching (n=1) -0.0203 0.2424*** -0.0576 0.0064 -0.0053**
(0.0843) (0.0848) (0.0577) (0.0582) (0.0022)
NN matching (n=5) -0.0393 0.2117*** -0.0663*** -0.0096 -0.0053**
(0.0371) (0.0488) (0.0127) (0.0199) (0.0022)
Note: The notes under this table are the same as those under table 11.
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Table 13: Differences by gender.
ATT Employed Unemployed Permanent Temporary Apprenticeship
Females
Linear regression 0.1454*** 0.0286 0.0113 0.0419** 0.0438***
(0.0280) (0.0243) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0140)
NN matching (n=1) 0.0498 0.1409** -0.0178 0.0213 0.0211**
(0.0354) (0.0598) (0.0257) (0.0233) (0.0097)
NN matching (n=5) 0.0547 0.1110*** -0.0199 0.0078 0.0205**
(0.0368) (0.0366) (0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0086)
Males
Linear regression 0.2575*** -0.0078 0.0925*** 0.0430 0.0868***
(0.0408) (0.0351) (0.0325) (0.0302) (0.0245)
NN matching (n=1) 0.2136*** 0.0558 0.1265** 0.0181 0.0769***
(0.0544) (0.0595) (0.0516) (0.0279) (0.0233)
NN matching (n=5) 0.1935*** 0.0943** 0.0803*** 0.0201 0.0671***
(0.0344) (0.0378) (0.0267) (0.0286) (0.0200)
Note: The notes under this table are the same as those under table 11.
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Table 14: Differences by field of study.
ATT Employed Unemployed Permanent Temporary Apprenticeship
Humanities
Linear regression 0.1435*** 0.0047 0.0283 0.0271 0.0473***
(0.0274) (0.0240) (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0136)
NN matching (n=1) 0.0686** 0.0510 0.0115 -0.0110 0.0322***
(0.0324) (0.0360) (0.0253) (0.0233) (0.0112)
NN matching (n=5) 0.0666* 0.0763* 0.0218 -0.0011 0.0244***
(0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0303) (0.0193) (0.0086)
Science
Linear regression 0.2502*** 0.0331 0.0823** 0.0264 0.0924***
(0.0484) (0.0407) (0.0386) (0.0347) (0.0312)
NN matching (n=1) 0.1755* 0.1076 0.0223 0.0436 0.0682**
(0.0937) (0.0898) (0.0394) (0.0405) (0.0271)
NN matching (n=5) 0.1996*** 0.1015 0.0128 0.0508 0.0499***
(0.0676) (0.0664) (0.0353) (0.0380) (0.0187)
Note: The notes under this table are the same as those under table 11.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the impact of an intervention aimed at increasing the employability of
graduates in the small Italian region of Umbria. The intervention subsidised “on-the-job training”
for unemployed graduates and had two main aims: 1) increase employment among unemployed
college graduates; 2) enhance the capacity and productivity of the participating firms. To eval-
uate the effectiveness of the intervention, we look at the employment status of participants and
similar non-participants in Umbria in 2015 (from one to two years after the intervention). The
evaluation exercise is performed using different sources of administrative data. More specifically,
information about participants in the WELL intervention was provided by the Regional Monitor-
ing System Database and information on the control group was gathered through the Compulsory
Communication Database (CCD). To estimate the causal effect of the intervention on the labour
market career of participants, i.e., the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), we em-
ploy a propensity score matching technique. Baseline results suggest that WELL participants are
more likely to be employed in Umbria, compared to similar non-participants. They also show a
higher probability of obtaining an apprenticeship contract after completing the training. Further-
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more, we find substantial differences by gender, with males having a higher probability of being
employed with a permanent contract or an apprenticeship contract. Heterogeneous effects by field
of study suggest more positive employment responses for individuals with a degree in science. By
contrast, individuals with degree in the humanities benefit somewhat less from participating in the
programme. A plausible explanation for this differential impact could be due to the the excess of
supply of individuals with a degree in the humanities compared to demand. Finally, the aforemen-
tioned gender difference in the employment responses to the programme may be explained by the
fact that men are more likely to obtain a science degree, when compared to women. However, par-
ticipants and non-participants seem to be equally likely to be registered as unemployed in Umbria,
which indicates that the final conclusions apply only to the Umbria region.
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